The design of Medicare Part D causes most Medicare beneficiaries to receive fragmented health insurance, whereby prescription drugs and other medical care are covered by separate insurance plans. Fragmentation of insurance plans is potentially inefficient since separate insurers maximize profits over only one component of healthcare spending, despite many complementarities and substitutabilities between types of healthcare. Fragmentation of some plans but not others can also lead to market distortions due to differential adverse selection, as integrated plans may use drug formulary designs to induce enrollment by patients who are profitable under Parts A & B, while stand-alone drug plans have no such incentive. We study whether the design of insurance plans in Medicare Part D reflects these two differences in incentives using data on the universe of Part D plan formularies, drug prices, and Medicare claims data. We find evidence consistent with both hypotheses. Relative to fragmented plans, integrated plans systematically design their drug formularies to encourage enrollment by beneficiaries with medical conditions that are profitable under Parts A & B. However, integrated plans also more generously cover drugs that have the potential to causally reduce medical costs. These large differences in incentives and plan design between integrated and fragmented plans are likely the precursors of substantial differential selection of enrollees, and the basic design of Medicare Part D abets this covert selection.
Introduction
A growing share of all public expenditures on health insurance in the US is paid to private companies that deliver public health insurance benefits. Medicare Parts C and D, which account for about one-third of all Medicare expenses, are delivered entirely by private companies, and 39 states have contracts with private managed care organizations to deliver Medicaid benefits (KFF, 2014) . Although the intention behind privatization is generally to increase efficiency, in the case of Medicare Part D the split between public and private provision of benefits has also introduced several strategic opportunities for insurers that may have reduced efficiency and increased total costs. First, the decision to privately deliver Part D benefits led to fragmentation of insurance benefits for enrollees in traditional Medicare, who receive public hospital and physician insurance, but private drug insurance. A minority (about 30%) of beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage (MA) plans have fully-integrated private insurance that bundles parts A, B, and D. As a result, beneficiaries in traditional Medicare receive benefits from public and private entities that care only about efficiently delivering one type of medical care, but have no incentive to consider the complementarity or substitutability between different treatment options when designing insurance plans. Empirical evidence from outside the Part D context, including Goldman and Philipson (2007); Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010); and Fendrick et al. (2001) , suggests that spillovers between drug and medical spending exist, and may be quite large. In fact, internalizing these spillovers was a key stated reason why Medicare Part D was created in the first place. 1 Second, the fragmentation of some plans but not others can lead to market distortions due to differential adverse selection. Specifically, MA Part D (MAPD) plans are incentivized to design their formularies to induce enrollment by beneficiaries from whom they expect to earn profits in Medicare Parts A & B, and to discourage enrollment by beneficiaries whose expected costs exceed the risk-adjusted revenue they would bring to the plan. It would be very difficult for most medical insurance plans to target enrollees with particular conditions through plan design features, since cost-sharing rules tend to span broad categories of care. However, for prescription drugs this is not the case-plans vary cost-sharing rules at the drug level, 2 providing a mechanism to very precisely alter the attractiveness of a plan to individuals with any condition associated with a prescription drug.
In this paper we study how the decision to add Part D benefits into the existing Medicare benefit structure by offering beneficiaries a choice between integrated MA plans or fragmented insurance affected the efficiency of the Medicare program. We examine whether integrated plans design drug formularies differently than fragmented plans to take advantage of the relationships between drug consumption and non-drug medical spending. First, we test whether integrated plans choose more generous formulary rules for drugs taken by patients that tend to be profitable in Medicare Parts A & B. If so, this would suggest that the introduction of Medicare Part D created an additional tool for insurers to induce selection into Medicare Advantage. 3 Second, we test whether integrated plans set cost-sharing rules in ways that internalize spillovers between drug and non-drug medical spending. For example, if the use of albuterol inhalers has the potential to reduce hospitalizations among asthma patients, MA plans should have stronger financial incentives to set low copayments to ensure that their enrollees have access to inhalers, since MA plans are liable for hospital costs whereas stand-alone Part D drug plans (SAPDs) are not. This difference in incentives between plan types has implications for the efficient allocation of medical spending across major classes of medical care.
Although there have been many papers that study adverse selection in health insurance markets, including theoretical discussions such as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and empirical studies such as Handel (2013) and Polyakova (2015) , less attention has been paid to empirically testing how adverse selection affects the design of insurance plans. One exception is Lustig (2010) , who studies how adverse selection affects the generosity of coverage in Medicare Advantage. In contrast, we study the mechanism itself that is likely to lead to beneficiary selection-the design of insurance plan formularies. Our analyses test whether MAPD formularies have features that are systematically different than stand-alone Part D formularies in ways that enhance advantageous selection and internalize the effects of spillovers between drug and medical spending.
Advantageous selection by MAPD plans is a well-known concern, and Medicare has several policies aimed at limiting selection. First, MA plans are required to be guaranteed issue, which prevents plans from overtly selecting beneficiaries by declining some applicants. However, guaranteed issue does not eliminate selection since plans can strategically design their benefits to induce non-random self-selection, or advertise to targeted audiences. In addition, Medicare uses risk-adjustment of payments to private firms to reduce the incentive for selection. Conceptually, the goal of risk-adjustment is to pay MA plans whatever amount of revenue equates expected profit for each enrollee, so that there is no expected benefit from selection. In practice, riskadjustment also does not completely eliminate selection incentives. To the extent that the risk-adjustment equation has either systematic error or excluded dimensions that are correlated with medical expenses, firms can increase selection on these dimensions, potentially increasing the total costs to the government of providing public insurance. For example, Brown et al. (2014) find that when Medicare changed the risk-adjustment formula to account for differences in the average costs of treating medical conditions, MA plans simply changed their strategies from selecting the lowest cost beneficiaries to selecting based on costs conditional on medical diagnoses. As a result, they find that these efforts to improve the risk-adjustment formula had no net effect on overpayments to MA plans, and the deadweight loss from advantageous selection into MA plans increased the total cost to the government by $30 billion in 2006 alone. Carey (2016) also shows that the separate risk-adjustment formula used for Medicare Part D has systematic errors caused in part by technological change over time, so that risk-adjustment does not neutralize selection incentives.
To test whether integrated MAPD formularies are designed to advantageously select beneficiaries with conditions that are profitable on the hospital and physician insurance segment, we use data from the universe of fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare beneficiary claims from 2008-2010. We first create a measure of average potential profits to MA plans from selection for each medical condition. Following the approach developed by Brown et al. (2014) , we calculate the total expenditures of all beneficiaries enrolled in FFS Medicare in each year. We then use the full population of Medicare beneficiaries who subsequently switch to MA plans, and calculate what the MA capitation payment would have been if the individual had been in an MA plan the prior year, and compare this to the actual FFS cost of that individual. Since the risk-adjustment formula is designed to set expected profits equal to zero for each medical condition, the extent to which there is a non-zero difference between capitation payments and FFS costs is due to the fact that switchers into MA plans are not randomly selected, whereas risk-adjustment formulas are calculated using the entire FFS population rather than just the subsequent switchers.
Next, we use claims data from the entire population of FFS Medicare beneficiaries, including diagnosis codes and prescription drug purchases, to estimate the relationships between each medical condition and each prescription drug active ingredient. This set of estimates can be thought of as an n × m matrix of n active ingredients and m medical conditions, where the ij th element in the matrix equals the marginal effect of a diagnosis of medical condition j on the probability of filling a prescription with active ingredient i. We then use these estimated joint probability distributions to calculate the expected risk-adjusted profit by drug active ingredient. 4 Finally, we use the ingredient-level risk-adjusted expected profit to test whether active ingredients taken by individuals with more profitable conditions are covered more generously by MAPDs than by SAPDs. Throughout the paper, we use the term 'MA switcher surplus' to refer to this expected risk-adjusted difference between counterfactual costs and revenue for each drug active ingredient. We also use estimates from Carey (2016) to control for drug-level risk-adjustment errors in Medicare Part D that could affect plan formulary design, and may otherwise confound our analyses. We call this Part D Surplus.
Our second primary hypothesis is that MAPDs more generously cover drugs that can causally reduce medical spending. This hypothesis is based on the body of literature documenting substantial spillovers between drug and non-drug healthcare spending, especially among the elderly and individuals with chronic conditions. Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010), find that 20% of the savings from increasing copayments for prescription drugs and physician visits are offset by increases in hospital costs, and 43% of the savings are offset among patients with chronic illnesses. The implication is that Part D formulary decisions could have substantial effects on both prescription drug spending and other medical spending.
To test whether drugs with medical spending offsets are covered more generously by MAPD plans, we first isolate the set of drugs where spillovers are most likely to occur. We use several alternative definitions that have been developed previously for similar purposes, each of which is based on information from medical experts. The first set of definitions comes from Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010), who assembled a team of physicians and pharmacists to create drug groups for this purpose. They define acute spillover drugs (CGM Acute Spillover) as those that "if not taken, will increase the probability of an adverse health event within a month or two," 5 and chronic spillover drugs (CGM Chronic Spillover) as those that are designed to treat "more persistent conditions that, if not treated, will result in a potentially adverse health event within the year." 6 We also use the list from Tamblyn et al. (2001) , who define classes of "essential" drugs as "medications that prevent deterioration in health or prolong life and would not likely be prescribed in the absence of a definitive diagnosis."
Although MAPD and SAPD plans have similar generosity levels on average, we show that this masks considerable differences in generosity across classes of drugs used to treat different diseases. For example, to an MA beneficiary purchasing Ace Inhibitors, Beta Blockers, or Coronary Vasodilators the share of total costs paid by the beneficiary is 32-38% higher on average than a beneficiary in an SAPD would pay, while the same share is about 11% lower for Antipsychotic and Antimanic drugs. These coverage differences are not random. We find that a one standard deviation change in a drug's MA switcher surplus measure ($151 annually) is associated with beneficiaries paying 8%-9% less out-of-pocket in MAPDs than they do in SAPDs during open enrollment, when the selection incentive is strongest. This suggests MA plans use Part D formularies as a mechanism to induce selection. Moreover, these differences remain about the same when comparing MAPD and SAPD plans owned by the same parent organization, suggesting that the difference in generosity is strategic, rather than due to information differences or firmlevel insurance design strategies. Since MA risk-adjustment does not consider prescription drugs, the Part D market provides an excluded dimension from the risk-adjustment formula that allows MAPD plans to 5 Examples of drugs on this list are: anticonvulsants, antimalarials, antiangials, coronary vasodilators, and thrombolytics. 6 Examples of drugs on this list are: analgesics, antivirals, ACE inhibitors, antigout medications, beta-blockers, hypertension drugs, statins, and glaucoma medications.
increase their ability to positively select healthier patients.
Consistent with evidence of spillover effects between drugs and other medical care, we also estimate that MA plans more generously cover drugs that causally reduce medical spending. Out-of-pocket costs are about 12%-13% lower for drugs that have spillover effects within 1-2 months (CGM Acute Spillover drugs), and about 3%-6% lower for drugs with spillover effects within 12 months (CGM Chronic Spillover drugs) in MA plans relative to SA plans. In addition, Tamblyn's list of essential drugs have about 7% lower out-ofpocket costs in MA plans. All of these effects persist when we compare generosity across plans for the exact same drug NDCs. MA plans are also less likely to use non-price formulary hurdles like prior authorization requirements and step therapy restrictions on CGM Acute and Chronic spillover drugs.
A related study by Starc and Town (2016) extends our work on spillover effects using reimbursement rate discontinuities as an instrument for enrollment in MA plans, following Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler (2013), to estimate that MA enrollment causes spending on drugs to increase, and that the effects are largest for this same set of CGM drugs. Their primary goal is to estimate a structural model to evaluate alternative policy scenarios, such as forcing SAPD plans to internalize spillover effects, which they estimate would cause drug spending to increase by 13% in SAPDs. Our paper instead focuses on the supply-side responses to spillover incentives in formulary design and also incorporates selection incentives, which we find to be correlated with spillover incentives.
Our findings suggest that the Medicare Part D regulations aimed at preventing targeted selection, including the rules that all Part D plans must cover at least two drugs in every therapeutic class, and the rule that forbids plans from discriminating against those with costly medical conditions (Hoadley 2005) , have not been entirely successful at eliminating selection incentives. However, the welfare effects of fragmentation of insurance coverage under Part D are ambiguous because MA plans also internalize spillover incentives.
In addition, since all MA plans have similar incentives, competition for consumers with profitable medical conditions may cause some of the potential rents from selection to be transferred back to consumers in the form of enhanced insurance benefits. 7 However, several studies have shown that similar types of cost savings are retained by insurers, and only around 20% is passed-through to consumers (see Cabral (2015)).
We focus in this paper on insurer behavior in responding to these Part D incentives when designing plans, and not on the resulting consumer behavior or net welfare effects. 8 The selection effect that we identity, however, clearly increases the cost to Medicare, and Part D formularies provide a mechanism for MA plans to select patients by medical condition with surgical precision. 7 For the remaining consumers, the ability to choose SAPD plans that do not face the same risk-adjustment problem mitigates some of the potential redistribution between beneficiaries that would otherwise occur if everyone were in MA plans. 8 See Han and Lavetti (2016) and Starc and Town (2016) for more on beneficiary responses to these plan differences. Part D insurance is heavily subsidized, although beneficiaries pay some out-of-pocket costs in addition to monthly premiums. In the 2015 standard benefit structure, beneficiaries pay the first $320 of annual drug costs (the deductible), then pay a 25% coinsurance on the next $2,640 spent, then pay 100% of the cost for the next $4102 (the "doughnut hole"), and 5% of all costs beyond that (the "catastrophic zone").
Although there was very active debate about the design of the standard benefit structure, 9 the law allows Part D plans a great deal of freedom in designing formularies, which was done to encourage private sector Plans are allowed to deviate from the standard benefit design provided they follow certain regulations.
First, the alternative cost-sharing structures must be actuarially equivalent to the standard plan, and must be "in accordance with standard industry practices" (CMS, 2007) . Plan formularies must also include at least two drugs in each therapeutic category (see CMS 2007 for details of categories), and must include substantially all drugs in six key therapeutic classes, although there is no restriction on how generously each drug must be covered. Plans are also forbidden from designing formularies that discriminate against those with costly medical conditions (Hoadley, 2005) , although it is not known how these requirements are audited.
The rules governing formulary design apply equally to MAPDs and SAPDs, so the regulations themselves should not generate differences in formulary design. The existence of these rules simply limits the degree to which MA plans can respond to the differential economic incentives they face.
Selection Incentives
Concerns about adverse selection are present in nearly every insurance market. These concerns can be especially heightened when risks are systematically correlated, as they are in the context of prescription drugs, where demand is highly autocorrelated from one year to the next. Selection may be heightened in prescription drug insurance markets as individuals often have private information that allows them to better predict their future demand for drugs than for other types of medical care. 11 In fact, Pauly and Zeng (2004) find that adverse selection problems may be so heightened in stand-alone prescription drug insurance that this market would not exist unless plans were subsidized, as they are under Part D, or bundled with other coverage to create a more comprehensive insurance product with less persistent spending, as is the case with MAPDs. Recent data show empirical evidence that insurers feared adverse selection when designing plans in the Medicare Advantage (MA) market prior to Part D. Lustig (2010) finds that insurers responded to adverse selection by constraining plan design, leading to a 14.5% reduction in the economic surpluses created by Medicare Advantage between 2000-2003.
There are several factors that reduce the incentive to strategically select beneficiaries. Starting in 2007 all reimbursements to MA plans became fully risk-adjusted, the culmination of a multi-year phase-in of a system known as hierarchical condition category (MedPAC 2006b), whereas prior rates were only adjusted for geographic and demographic factors. 12 MedPAC (2006b) explains that part of the reason for these changes was to encourage participation by private insurers in traditionally under-served rural areas of the country.
However, there is evidence that even after risk adjustment was fully introduced in 2007, MA plans are still able to profit by favorably selecting healthier patients conditional on risk scores. Within Part D there are several features that dull selection incentives for both MA and SA plans. First, Part D pays insurers on a risk-adjusted basis using a formula that accounts for the average difference in drug spending among FFS Medicaid beneficiaries with different medical conditions. The goal of risk-adjustment is to make plans approximately indifferent between randomly selected FFS beneficiaries with different illnesses.
Of course, as Brown et al. (2014) show, and we find in our data, selection into MA plans is far from random.
Second, Part D has risk-corridors to prevent plans from earning excessive profits or losses. Since 2008 those risk-corridors have been set such that if drug spending is between 5%-10% higher than expected based on the plan's average risk profile, then 50% of the plan's excess spending is returned as a subsidy, and if spending exceeds expectations by more than 10% the subsidy increases to 80%. The risk-corridors are also symmetric, imposing a large effective tax rate on profits that exceed 5% or 10% of expected drug spending in a year. Nonetheless, these corridors leave sufficient opportunity for typical profit margins that are observed in markets without risk-corridors. For example, a 2013 report by CMS estimated that, on average, private insurance companies in the US earned profit margins of about 5.3% in small group markets and 3.8% in large group markets. 14 The ability to induce self-selection through strategic formulary design also depends on how sensitive beneficiaries are to differences in generosity when choosing insurance plans. The evidence from the literature on choice inconsistencies, including as Abaluck and Gruber (2011), suggests that consumers were far less responsive to out-of-pocket costs than they were to plan premiums in the first year of Medicare Part D.
However, Ketcham et al. (2012) find that overspending on out-of-pocket costs fell by 55% in subsequent years, suggesting that consumer learning may have increased responsiveness of plan choice to generosity.
There is also a larger body of evidence that consumers are responsive to out-of-pocket costs when purchasing drugs, conditional on plan choice. Although the well-known RAND health insurance experiment estimated the elasticity of demand for medical care to be quite low, about -0.2 (Newhouse et al., 1993) , subsequent research focusing on elderly patients has found elasticities of demand for prescription drugs to be much higher. 
Conceptual Framework
To help clarify our empirical objects of interest, we start with a very basic theoretical description of the selection and management incentives. For SAPD plans, profit maximization entails choosing a premium bid, which affects the calculation of federal premium subsidies, and choosing the coinsurance rates of each drug.
Although Part D formulary coverage schedules tend to be nonlinear (in that coinsurance rates generally change as a function of total spending), we abstract by considering the average share of drug's total cost that is covered by the insurer, r d . The SAPD profit function is:
where P (r d ) is the monthly plan premium paid by beneficiaries, which depends on the generosity of the plan's coverage of the set of d drugs, S(r d ) is the monthly federal subsidy payment, which depends on P , c(r d ) is the cost of insuring a beneficiary, and Q is the number of enrollees, which may depend on the plan premium, federal subsidies, and plan generosity.
Consider the decision over the generosity of a single drug with index d = 1. The SAPD plan's FOC is:
In contrast, the profit function for an MA plan includes both drug and medical components. Consider the MA plan's problem that takes into account interactions with medical profits.
where M AR(r d ) is the average risk-adjusted revenue that an MA plan gets for Part A and B coverage, which could depend on the drug formulary generosity insofar as formulary design affects the composition of enrollees, and M Ac(r d ) is the average non-drug medical cost of enrollees that choose the plan. The difference between these terms is the selection incentive that MAPDs face, but SAPDs do not.
A similar decision over the generosity of coverage of an arbitrary drug with index d = 1 is determined by the FOC:
There are two sets of terms that cause an MAPD plan's decision over r 1 to potentially differ from an SAPD's decision. The first is ∂M Ac(r d ) ∂r1 Q, which captures the spillover effect between drugs and the cost of medical treatment. For example, if choosing to generously cover asthma inhalers decreases the probability that an enrollee will have an adverse event leading to hospitalization, then this spillover term would be positive, and likely much larger in magnitude than ∂c(r d ) ∂r1 since the cost of inhalers is very low relative to emergency care. In our empirical application we do not observe the spillover derivative separately for each drug, so we rely on the knowledge of the medical experts that created the CGM Acute Spillover, CGM Chronic Spillover, and Tamblyn Essential Drugs lists to determine which drugs have the most positive derivatives. In theory there could also be drugs with negative average derivatives, for example if medical care like physician checkups are complementary to drug purchases, as may be the case in the treatment of depression.
The second set of terms is:
The first component could be nonzero if the choice of r 1 affects the composition of enrollees in the plan in a way that alters average risk scores. In this case the revenue effect is Q times the change in average medical revenue per enrollee. Since plan enrollment choices depend on many factors, the impact of coverage generosity of any single drug may be quite small for most individuals, in which case this term will be close to zero. Second, the choice of r 1 could affect enrollment decisions of beneficiaries, differentially increasing the profits of an MA plan by the average difference between medical revenue and medical cost times the responsiveness of demand to the generosity of insurance coverage of the drug, r 1 . This term differs from zero if the risk-adjustment formula does not fully eliminate the difference between revenue and cost for enrollees in MA plans. As described above, this could occur, for example, if MA plans are successful at attracting lower cost enrollees within medical conditions, consistent with evidence from Brown et al. (2014) .
Since the spillover effect term is scaled by Q, while most of the variation in the selection incentive is likely to be come from the term that is scaled by ∂Q ∂r1 , this suggests that the spillover effect should be relatively stronger for MA plans with high market shares, where enrollment is larger relative to the potential to gain new enrollees. We return to this point in the empirical analyses, where we test for differential effects of the spillover and selection hypotheses in MA plans with larger market shares.
Data and Empirical Methods
In order to test the key selection and spillover hypotheses, we first construct empirical analogues of the terms in the first order conditions above. We begin by estimating the difference between risk-adjusted revenue and costs for the medical component of MA plans. We then describe the data and methods used to test each of the hypotheses by combining the risk-adjustment estimates for each drug with data on plan formularies, Medicare claims data on drug purchases and medical conditions, negotiated drug prices, and plan-level enrollment data. Finally, we discuss risk-adjustment in Part D, which is calculated separately from Parts A & B risk-adjustment.
Medicare Advantage Risk-Adjustment and Selection
The primary selection incentive that we study arises due to the fact that risk-adjustment in Medicare Parts A & B does not eliminate the potential for plans to profit through selection, as shown by Brown et al.
(2014). The first step of our analyses is to quantify the magnitude of the selection incentives that MA plans face for each medical condition in the risk-adjustment formula. To do this, we use claims data from the universe of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries from 2008-2010. Using Medicare's internal calculations of patient risk-scores, we calculate the counterfactual capitation payment that an MA plan would receive for each beneficiary, if they were to enroll in MA. For each year from 2009-2010, and for each beneficiary that was in FFS Medicare for the full prior calendar year, we then calculate the difference between the actual observed FFS spending and the counterfactual capitation payment that an MA plan would have received if that beneficiary enrolled. If the entire FFS population were to switch into MA plans at the same time this difference would approximately equal zero due to the risk-adjustment formula. However, since the switchers from FFS to MA are non-randomly selected, the average annual spending of the population of FFS beneficiaries who subsequently choose to switch to MA plans is $902 less than the spending of those who remain in FFS, conditional on medical diagnoses and other characteristics included in the risk-adjustment formula. This finding is consistent with advantageous selection of beneficiaries into MA plans as in Brown et al. (2014) , and is very close to the similar statistic estimated by Batata (2004) of $1030 using data from the early 1990s. For brevity, we refer to this difference throughout the paper as the expected 'MA switcher surplus.'
Using the MA switcher surplus as a dependent variable, we estimate the surplus associated with each of the 70 medical conditions in the risk-adjustment formula using the the following fixed effects regression:
where M A Switch it is an indicator that equals one if person i switched from FFS into an MA plan in year
is an indicator that equals one if person i had a diagnosis associated with Medicare Hierarchical Condition Code (HCC) k in the prior year, and X it is a vector of control variables that includes
year effects, age effects, race effects, a gender effect, interactions between race effects and an indicator that equals 1 if the individual originally entered Medicare due to a disability, and ψ c(it) is a set of county effects that equals one for the county in which beneficiary i lived in year t. Note that X it contains the set of variables used by CMS for risk-adjustment.
The key parameters of interest from this model are the 70 estimated values of γ k . Figure 1 shows the distribution of these estimates, along with the 95% confidence intervals. The estimated MA switcher surplus is statistically significantly different from zero for 48 out of 70 HCCs. For 46 of these conditions the estimate is significant and positive, suggesting that lower cost beneficiaries within these HCCs are more likely to switch into MA plans.
To be clear, these estimates do not necessarily equal MA plan profit. The costs of treating beneficiaries in MA plans may differ from the costs under FFS, and is this cost difference is not included in our calculation since we have no data on beneficiary costs in MA plans. In addition, as discussed by Geruso and Layton (2016) , to the extent that enrollment in MA plans has a causal effect on risk scores through upcoding, our estimated capitation revenue may understate the revenue that an MA plan would actually receive. The calculation that we use, which is similar to that used by Brown 
Mapping Medical Conditions to Drug Purchases
The final step of the calculation is to use the estimated values γ k from Equation 1 to calculate the predicted MA switcher surplus by drug active ingredient, rather than by HCC code. The goal is to be able to link each drug on every plan formulary to a measure of the predicted MA surplus that a plan would earn if an average enrollee who takes a drug with that active ingredient were to enroll in the MA plan. In order to connect this selection incentive to formulary design, we use Medicare claims to construct a complete mapping of all medical conditions used in risk-adjustment calculations to each drug covered by Part D plans. To account for the fact that drugs with the same active ingredient are used to treat the same condition(s), and so they should conceptually have the same selection effect, we link each drug NDC code to its active ingredient using the NDC product database. 16 Beginning with the universe of Medicare Part D claims data from 2008-2010, we link each NDC code in the claims data to its active ingredient, and for each beneficiary-year we construct a set of binary variables indicating whether the beneficiary filled a prescription with that active ingredient in that year. We then link this file to a database of all of the HCC conditions for that beneficiary, which is derived from each of the patient's diagnoses. This provides an individual-year level database of every active ingredient purchased and every medical diagnosis for the population of FFS beneficiaries.
We estimate a separate probit model for each active ingredient in the data. In each model the dependent variable equals one if the beneficiary purchased a drug with the given active ingredient in a given year, and zero otherwise. The independent variables are simply a set of binary variables for each of the 70 HCC condition codes used in the Medicare Advantage risk-adjustment formula.
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This set of equations gives a d × h matrix of coefficients, ν, where d is the top 707 most frequently purchased active ingredients, 17 and h is 70, corresponding to the number of HCC codes.
For each estimated ν h we calculate the predicted marginal effect of having HCC h on the probability of taking a drug with the given active ingredient. We then calculate the predicted MA switcher surplus at the active ingredient level as:
where γ h are the estimated coefficients from Equation 1 and ν dh is the row vector from the coefficient matrix from Equation 2 corresponding to the same active ingredient d. Equation 3 gives the probability that a beneficiary takes drug d given their HCC codes times the MA switcher surplus for each of those HCC codes, which equals the expected MA switcher surplus at the active ingredient level, taking into account the full joint distribution of HCC codes and drug active ingredient consumption in the population. Figure 2 shows the distribution of drug-level MA switcher surpluses, which is the key variable we will use to test the selection hypothesis. 18 The mean of the distribution is $55, and the standard deviation is $152.
Part D Formularies and MA Medical Spillover Incentives
We use the CMS Formulary Files and Quarterly Pricing Files to test for differences in Part D formulary designs in SAPD and MAPD plans. The Formulary Files contain monthly data on the universe of MAPD and SAPD plans offered in the country since Part D implementation at the beginning of 2006. In particular, they provide the formulary status of drugs, tier location, whether prior authorization, step therapy and quantity limits are imposed, and limited information about cost sharing policies corresponding to tiers. The Quarterly Pricing Files began being released in 2009, and include data on the average reimbursement prices negotiated between each plan and the in-area retail pharmacies for that plan at the NDC-level. Together, these two files provide complete information about the generosity of the universe of Part D plans. Prior to 2009 the Formulary files contained cost-sharing rules, but the cost of the drug to the insurance company was unknown, making it impossible to calculate the percentage of the total cost that the consumer must pay for drugs with fixed copayments. We use data on prices from the Quarterly Pricing Files between the first quarter of 2009 and the third quarter of 2011. Table 1 shows summary statistics of our measures of plan generosity from these data sources.
We link into the formulary data the lists of drugs that we use to test the spillover hypothesis. We use the CGM Acute Spillover and CGM Chronic Spillover lists developed by Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010), with the minor caveat that the drug classification system that their lists were based upon, which was developed in 1995, is no longer in use, and therefore cannot be linked perfectly to current NDC codes, many of which did not exist in 1995. As a result we developed a linkage mapping the 1995 standard drug classification system into the classification system that is currently used by CMS, the United States Pharmacopeia Classification System. This mapping was largely straightforward, but there were some classes that were not uniquely matchable to the USP system, so our versions of the lists are subsets of the original lists containing 73% of the Acute and 72% of the Chronic classes. 19 19 The unmatched drug classes on the CGM Acute Care Drug list include: Adrenal Corticosteroids, Anaphylaxis Treatment Kit, Antiasthmatics/broncodilators, Antitoxins/antivenins, Chloramphenicol/derivatives, DNA Damaging Drugs, Hypotension/shock drugs, Ocular Anti-infective/anti-inflammator, Polymyxins, and Vascular Disorders/Cerebral/periphera drugs. The unmatched drug classes on the CGM Chronic Care Drug list include: Antidiuretics, Calcium Metabolism drugs, Miscellaneous CNS drugs, Cycloplegics/mydriatics, Deficiency Anemias, Acid/peptic Disorder drugs, Hematopoietic Growth Factors, Notes: Summary statistics from formulary pricing files between the first quarter of 2009 and third quarter of 2011. 'Initial Coverage Cost-Sharing' is the out-of-pocket cost divided by the total average cost of the drug. 'Number of Plan-Drug Pairs' is the number of unique NDC code and plan formulary pairs, and refers only to drugs that are on-formulary. 'Percent of Drugs on Formulary' is calculated as the share of NDC codes that each plan covers among the full set of NDC codes that were covered by at least one plan in the same quarter.
A second list that we use is the one developed by Tamblyn et al. (2001) , which similarly relied upon clinical experts to classify drugs according to whether they are 'essential,' which was defined as: "medications that prevent deterioration in health or prolong life and would not likely be prescribed in the absence of a definitive diagnosis." Since the Tamblyn list is based on a different classification system than the CGM lists, they are not directly overlapping, and all three lists can be included simultaneously in our models without causing substantial collinearity problems.
Part D Risk-Adjustment
In addition to the selection incentive that MA plans face due to the MA switcher surplus, all Part D plans face separate selection incentives caused by differences in Part D profitability across medical conditions. Carey (2016) shows that these risk-adjustment 'errors' have arisen primarily because the risk-adjustment formulas have remained the same while new drug entry and the onset of generic competition changed the cost of treatment for many diagnoses. Although these selection incentives are uniform across all plans that we study, it is possible that by chance they may be correlated with our key variables of interest that measure differential selection and spillover incentives among MAPDs. To remove any potential omitted variable bias caused by these correlations, we control for the Part D selection incentive using the expected profit or loss associated with each drug in the CMS plan formularies, which was calculated by Carey (2016 through a two-step process. The first step is to link each drug in the formulary files to the mostly likely medical diagnosis associated with that drug. This is done by separately regressing an indicator of the use of each active ingredient molecule on a set of indicators for medical diagnoses in the claims data, using probit models. The second step is to aggregate treatment costs by patient in the Part D claims data, and regress treatment costs on the set of indicators of predicted diagnoses associated with the drugs taken by each person. Carey (2016) shows that Part D plans respond to these Part D selection incentives in the design of their formularies, consistent with the general type of strategic behavior that we investigate in this paper, but she does not suggest or test the differential incentives between integrated and stand-alone drug plans.
The predictions from this model yield expected treatment costs by diagnosis, which can then be compared to the formulaic risk-adjusted payments by diagnosis that are set by Medicare, and the difference between the two is the expected profit or loss associated with each medical condition. Figure 3 shows the distribution of risk-adjusted Part D profits by drug NDC code, for all drugs that appear on Part D formularies. The distribution has a mean value of -$68, but has substantial mass away from zero, suggesting that riskadjustment has not fully eliminated selection incentives. 
Empirical Model
There are several forms of identifying variation that we use in the analyses. On the extensive margin, variation in plan incentives is summarized in Table 3 . MA formularies year-round, but there may be some differential effects during open enrollment. On the intensive margins, we quantify the strength of the selection incentive using the drug-level MA switcher surplus calculated above, and use the three lists of spillover drugs as indicators for drugs where the spillover incentive should be strongest. We omit the selection incentives caused by imperfect Part D risk-adjustment from the table, since these incentives are always the same for all plans. Table 2 presents summary statistics that are suggestive of differences in formulary design. The coefficients are the average differences in the share of drug costs that must be paid out-of-pocket by beneficiaries between MAPD and SAPD plans by drug class. Although Table 1 showed that the average generosity of drug coverage in MAPD plans is similar to SAPD plans, Table 2 shows that this masks substantial heterogeneity in generosity across different classes of drugs. For example, the share of costs paid out of pocket by MAPD enrollees is 11.5% less for Antipsychotic and Antimanic drugs than the share paid by SAPD enrollees.
However, MAPD enrollees pay about 32-38% more out of pocket for Beta Blockers, Coronary Vasodilators, and Ace Inhibitors. For the majority of classes, these differences in generosity occur across plan types within the exact same drug NDC code, as shown in column 2. These generosity differences are all conditional on any differences in plan premiums, deductibles, or any differences across plan types in drug prices negotiated with pharmacies.
Next we test our main hypotheses: whether the differences in generosity are explained by the selection and spillover incentives. Our main empirical specification is:
where LogOOPCost jdt is the log of out-of-pocket costs for drug d in plan j in quarter t, X jdt includes a polynomial in drug cost, an MA indicator, the monthly plan premium and annual deductible, estimated Part The spillover effects hypothesis is β 7 < 0, which would indicate that MA plans more generously cover drugs that have the potential to reduce hospital and other medical costs. We test the selection hypotheses two ways. The selection hypothesis is β 4 < 0, which corresponds to more generous coverage of drugs that tend to be taken by profitable MA beneficiaries. There is also a secondary question in the selection hypothesis, corresponding to β 5 < 0. This would indicate especially strong selection effects during open enrollment, when out-of-pocket costs for drugs may have the strongest effects on consumer plan choices. We test both the selection and spillover hypotheses in the same model to account for any potential correlation between the selection and spillover variables. For example, if a drug has both a high MA switcher surplus and high spillover potential, testing the hypotheses in separate models could bias the estimates.
Results

Selection Effects
Estimates from Equation 4, our main specification, are shown in the similarity of these two estimates is what we would expect to find. However, there appears to be some difference in the substitution patterns of drug generosity across versus within drug classes. When we include fixed drug class effects we find that the estimates are smaller and differ between plan types: out-of-pocket costs are 2.2% higher for SAPDs and 4.8% higher for MAPDs per $100 increase in Part D surplus. This is consistent with the possibility that plans use formularies to induce selection broadly at the condition level, which may be associated with a class of drugs, rather than by type of drug within a class, where (unobserved) bonus payments from drug manufacturers tied to tier placement may play a role in determining the relative generosity of coverage. Column 5 shows that within drug NDC codes, MA plans are less responsive to Part D profits than SAPD plans. When Part D profits increase over time for a given drug, a $100 increase in Part D profits increases the out of pocket costs in MAPDs relative to SAPDs by 1.3%. This is as expected, since MAPDs have less incentive to care about profits from just the Part D component to the extent that Part D profits may be negatively correlated with profits from the medical component of the plan.
Case Study: Fentanyl
As an example of the effects of MA selection incentives on formulary design, we consider the case of the drug fentanyl. Fentanyl is the most commonly prescribed synthetic opioid pain reliever in the US. It is extremely potent, hundreds of times more potent than pure pharmaceutical heroin, according to the CDC.
It is used primarily for palliative care, including the management of chronic pain, especially pain associated with cancer. Originally developed in 1960, there are several competing manufacturers that produce fentanyl, with a variety of delivery mechanisms, but with the same active ingredient. In the Medicare Part D formulary files, there are 11 unique drug NDC codes corresponding to fentanyl that are covered on plan formularies, and over 164,000 plan-drug-year observations associated with fentanyl in our data.
Based on our analysis using Medicare claims data of the mapping between drug active ingredients and HCC codes, we estimate that the condition that is most predictive of fentanyl use is HCC 7, metastatic cancer and acute leukemia. The second most predictive condition according to our model is HCC 157, vertebral fractures without spinal cord injury. Reassuringly, our estimates are completely consistent with described uses of the drug in the medical literature (see Stanley 2014) .
As shown in Figure 1 In the formulary data there are 5 NDC codes (out of 11 total) that represent 94% of fentanyl observations.
As shown in Table 5 , MAPD plans more generously cover all 5 of these NDC codes. On average, beneficiaries in MAPD plans pay about 80% less out-of-pocket for fentanyl than do beneficiaries in SAPDs. These differences in coverage generosity are largely caused by MAPDs choosing to place fentanyl on lower coverage tiers. 61.5% of MAPD plan-drug observations for these 5 NDC codes are on tier 1, the tier of most generously covered drugs, compared to just 53.7% of SAPDs. Only 6.5% of MAPD observations are on tier 3 or above, compared to 12.1% for SAPDs.
Within NDC codes, unconditional out-of-pocket costs for fentanyl are 92% less in MAPDs. After conditioning on plan-level negotiated prices with pharmacies, plan deductible, premium, Carey Part D riskadjustment errors, and quarter-by-year effects, the conditional difference between MAPD and SAPD plans is about three times larger than the unconditional difference. Our main empirical specification uses this same form of analysis, but aggregates results for all drugs.
Spillover Effects in Integrated Plans
We also find strong and consistent evidence that integrated MAPD plans internalize spillovers when designing drug formularies. Columns 1-4 in Table 4 show that for Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight's (CGM) Acute Spillover drugs, that will increase the probability of an adverse health event within 1-2 months if not taken, out-of-pocket costs are 12-13% lower in MAPDs than in SAPDs. The result also holds within NDC codes, with a 7% difference in costs. As expected, there is a significant but smaller effect for CGM Chronic Spillover drugs, that will increase the probability of an adverse health event within one year if not taken. Out of pocket costs are 3-6% lower in MAPDs for these drugs, and 1% lower within NDC codes, suggesting that the majority of this effect is driven by substitution in formulary coverage or generosity across drugs rather than being driven by differences across plan within NDC. Although the Tamblyn essential drugs list overlaps with the CGM lists, which could attenuate estimates somewhat, the results suggest consistently lower out of pocket costs in MAPD plans for all three lists even when they are all included in the model at the same time. We find that out of pocket costs are 7-8% lower in MAPD plans for Tamblyn essential drugs, conditional on CGM Lists, and this result is almost entirely due to within NDC differences in generosity across plan types.
As shown in Appendix Table 11 , the estimated CGM Acute and Chronic Spillover effects both increase in magnitude when the Tamblyn Essential variables are excluded from the model. This evidence is consistent with Starc and Town (2016) , who build on this analysis of formulary differences to study consumer choice, and show that enrollment in an MAPD causally increases drug expenditures.
Heterogeneity in Selection Effects
One important question given the above estimates on the selection effects of integrated MAPD plans on formulary designs is: are these differences in formulary generosity designed primarily to induce enrollment by profitable beneficiaries, to deter enrollment by unprofitable enrollees, or both?
In Table 7 tests whether these differences in plan design incentives affect other dimensions of coverage generosity, including non-price measures like the use of quantity limits, prior authorization, and step therapy restrictions.
Non-Price Formulary Generosity
Each of these formulary dimensions limits beneficiaries' coverage in some way. Quantity limits impose a cap on how many prescriptions or days of prescriptions a beneficiary can purchase. Prior authorization requires the beneficiary to get permission from the insurer before a given drug will be covered, adding both a hassle cost and potential ambiguity to the expected generosity of coverage.
Step therapy restrictions require beneficiaries to try the most cost-effective forms of treatment before they are allowed to purchase more costly treatment options. Table 7 presents log odds ratio estimates from logit models in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the plan-drug observation has each of these three formulary hurdles. The estimates show that MAPD plans partially offset the higher monetary generosity of coverage for drugs with high switcher surplus values by imposing more non-price restrictions. For example, a $100 increase in MA switcher surplus increases the probability that a drug in an MAPD plan will have a quantity limit by 6.6%, and increases prior authorization and step therapy by 2.4% and 4.6%, respectively. The gap in coverage restrictions between MAPD and SAPD plans grows even larger during open-enrollment, more than doubling in the case of quantity limits and step therapy. One explanation for these opposing directions of generosity differences is that monetary generosity is more salient to consumers or has a larger effect on selection.
Also consistent with expectations, MA plans are less likely to make beneficiaries face these hurdles to acquire drugs that could lead to adverse medical events if not taken. MAPD are significantly less likely to impose step therapy or prior authorization for both CGM Acute and Chronic spillover drugs. In the case of quantity limits there is no meaningful effect of CGM Acute Spillover drugs, and there is a modest reduction in use for CGM Chronic Spillover drugs. The effects of Tamblyn Essential drugs are mixed, but this may be due to the fact that the list overlaps somewhat with the CGM spillover lists. Table 8 also presents estimates from models in which the dependent variable is an indicator for the inclusion of a drug on the formulary. The estimates shown are from OLS linear probability models, due to computational convergence problems with logit specifications given the large sample. 20 The mean of the dependent variable, shown in Table 1 , is about 0.63, and less than 8% of observations have predicted probabilities that exceed one or are below zero. As Table 8 shows there are no economically meaningful effects of either incentive on the extensive margin coverage decision. As a result, the intensive margin of formulary coverage generosity appears to be the primary mechanism for either inducing enrollment or managing medical cost externalities.
Extensive Margin Formulary Coverage Effects
This finding could also suggest that the CMS rules forbidding plans from excluding too many drugs from their formulary are binding constraints on formulary design. These findings suggest that the effects documented cannot be explained, for example, by differences in information or data available to different insurance companies, or to differences across firms in insurance design strategies.
Plan Enrollment and Market Share
The theoretical framework in Section 3 suggests that the relative magnitudes of the spillover and selection effects may change as Q, the number of enrollees, changes relative to ∂Q ∂r , the change in enrollment in response to a change in formulary generosity. Intuitively, if a plan already has a very large market share, there is little scope for inducing further enrollment, and we have found evidence that plans do not appear to design formularies to encourage disenrollment of unprofitable beneficiaries. As a result, the spillover incentive in this case should be larger, while the selection incentive should decrease.
In Appendix Table 12 we test for evidence that plans with larger market shares place more emphasis on the medical spillover incentive. We find no significant or meaningful difference in the generosity of coverage of drugs on any of the three spillover lists when plan market shares are larger. This finding holds both across plans on average, and within plans. The conclusion is also the same when plan enrollment levels are used rather than market shares.
Summary and Discussion
The introduction of Part D was the first time in the history of Medicare that beneficiaries were required to receive benefits exclusively from private plans. Despite guidelines that constrain certain aspects of plan design, plans are allowed considerable flexibility in designing their coverage formularies. It is important for future Part D public policy decisions to know how this flexibility has affected the design of plans.
We evaluate one aspect of the extent to which Part D is achieving this goal of reducing costs by integrating coverage. The fundamental question of interest is whether the option to provide stand-alone drug coverage leads to inefficient cost minimization that does not account for spillovers between drugs and medical care.
Ideally, we would like to know whether exogenously assigned enrollees have higher total costs when they are covered by separate insurance plans, but the problem of non-random assignment prevents us from identifying this directly. Instead we examine the drug formularies directly and look for evidence that firms respond to these incentives when designing coverage formularies. Starc and Town (2016) and Han and Lavetti (2016) build on this idea to show that consumers indeed respond to the formulary differences that we find, and that the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006 increased MA plans' ability to advantageously select enrollees.
Using data on the universe of Medicare Part D formularies between 2009-2011 and the universe of feefor-service Medicare claims data from 2008-2010, we test the hypotheses that integrated plans design their formularies differently than stand-alone plans to internalize spillovers between drug and medical costs, and that integrated plans design formularies to discourage enrollment by people with high medical costs. We find strong and consistent empirical support for both hypotheses when comparing the out-of-pocket costs that consumers would face for the same drugs in different types of plans. MAPDs cover drugs more generously when the medical conditions treated by those drugs tend to be more profitable, consistent with the selection hypothesis. For example, a patient with a condition that happens to be one standard deviations less profitable to a Medicare Advantage plan, given the risk-adjustment formula, would have to pay about 5% -9% more out of pocket for their drugs if they were to choose an MAPD over an SAPD, because of this selection effect.
We also find that integrated MAPD plans internalize medical spillover effects associated with drug purchases, and as result they cover drugs more generously than stand-alone drug plans, reducing out-of-pocket costs to enrollees by up to 13% relative to stand-alone plans for drugs that have short-run spillover effects within 1-2 months.
These results are significant for current Part D debates about whether to change the flexibility given to plans. They also provide information about the extent to which risk-adjustment and Medicare rules affect the incentive and ability of Medicare Advantage plans to select healthier patients, and build upon evidence from Brown et al. (2014) that efforts to remove profit incentives through risk-adjustment have simply resulted in changes in the targets of selection, rather than a net reduction in the incentive. The results are also relevant to a practical issue of reimbursement cuts for MA plans for non-drug care, which has been proposed as a potential source of cost-savings. Evidence that integrated MAPDs increase welfare relative to stand-alone plans by more effectively minimizing health care costs may be of direct relevance for the way that MA plans are compensated overall. Finally, the results of this research are useful for understanding the extent to which the fragmentation of health insurance generally affects plan design, which is the primary channel through which adverse or advantageous selection is likely to arise in insurance markets. 
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